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The programme to policy linkage: The fulfilment of election
pledges on socio-economic policy in the Netherlands, 1986–1998
ROBERT THOMSON
University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands
Abstract. To what extent are the contents of party election programmes congruent with
subsequent government policy actions? Existing research on the fulfilment of pre-election
pledges focuses on systems of government in which executives formed by a single parties are
the norm. This study extends this research to coalition systems of government. Specific policy
proposals made by the main Dutch parties in their recent election programmes are identified
and compared with subsequent government policy actions. Hypotheses about the conditions
under which pledges are more likely to be acted upon are formulated and tested. Although
clear linkages between election programmes and subsequent policies are found, pledges made
by prospective coalition parties in the Netherlands are less likely to be acted upon than those
made by prospective governing parties in the United Kingdom. Prominent features of cabinet
government, such as the allocation of ministerial portfolios and the coalition policy agreement,
are found to influence the likelihood of pledges being fulfilled. In addition, consensus between
parties is also found to increase the likelihood of government actions responding to election
pledges.
Introduction
This article is about the congruence between the contents of party election
programmes published before elections and subsequent government policy
actions. This stage of the democratic process is central to theories of how
democracies do and should operate. The mandate theory of democracy attrib-
utes particular importance to this ‘programme to policy linkage’ (Birch 1975;
Klingemann et al. 1994). Political parties that form governments are said
to receive a mandate to translate their proposals into government policies.
Modern democracies are party democracies, since political representatives
are bound to the election programme of their party (Budge & Newton et al.
1997: 261–263).
In view of its importance many scholars have devoted considerable at-
tention to this stage of the democratic process (Pomper & Lederman 1980;
Rose 1980; Rallings 1987; Kalogeropoulou 1989; Klingemann et al. 1994;
Royed 1996). In many such studies, the specific policy commitments, election
pledges, made by parties in their election programmes are identified. The ex-
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tent to which these pledges are congruent with subsequent government policy
is then evaluated. This is also the approach employed in this paper. Another
approach to the study of the programme to policy linkage is the saliency
approach which examines the congruence between the emphasis parties place
on different policy themes and subsequent government spending patterns on
related policy areas (Klingemann et al. 1994). The relationship between the
saliency approach and the appraoch used in this study is discussed in Royed
(1996) and Thomson (1999a).
Existing research on the fulfilment of election pledges focuses on gov-
ernment systems in which a single party normally forms the government
executive: the United Kingdom, Canada, the USA, and Greece. A recent
review of the literature concluded that ‘there is something of a gap in terms
of our knowledge of the fulfilment of pledges in coalition systems of govern-
ment that are far more typical of modern Europe’ (Gallagher, Laver & Mair
1995: 374). The research presented here seeks to make a contribution to this
neglected issue by examining the fulfilment of election pledges in three recent
government periods in the Netherlands. As will become clear, the extension
of this approach to coalition governments also allows the effects of a number
of mechanisms of coalition government to be examined. In particular, hypo-
theses will be formulated and tested regarding the effects of the distribution
of ministerial portfolios and the formulation of coalition agreements between
prospective governing parties on the likelihood of pledge fulfilment.
In the following section, the hypotheses to be tested are formulated. This
includes a discussion of some of the main findings from the existing liter-
ature, and propositions forwarded in the literature on coalition governance.
In the third section, the research design employed in the present study is
described. This includes a discussion of the empirical focus on pledges made
by Dutch parties, the measurement of pledges and their fulfilment, and several
examples of election pledges and apparently congruent government actions.
This is intended to provide insight into the substance of the quantitative
analyses presented in the fourth section, in which the hypotheses are tested.
Expectations regarding the fulfilment of election pledges
Discursive variants of mandate theory can be found in the work of postwar
commentators on liberal democracy, whose work has become known as ‘the
responsible party model’ (APSA 1950; Friedrich 1963). Despite the changing
nature of electoral behaviour and party organisation, the mandate theory is
of enduring relevance to contemporary discussions of democracy (e.g., Dahl
1991; Klingemann et al. 1994; Budge & Newton et al. 1997). Mandate theory
has a number of observable implications at various stages of the democratic
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process, of which the programme to policy linkage is one. Downs’ book An
Economic Theory of Democracy (1957) contains perhaps the most succinct
statement of mandate theory (Klingemann et al. 1994: 31). Downs’ model
consists of two sets of actors: political parties and voters. Politicians are
assumed to be motivated by the goal of obtaining the material benefits associ-
ated with holding government office. Voters are assumed to be motivated by
securing government policies that are most favourable to their own interests.
Accordingly, parties formulate election programmes containing policy initi-
atives in order to win votes. Voters will, other things being equal, vote for the
party that adopts policies closest to their own preferences. In a party system
consisting of two parties, the party that receives the most votes becomes the
governing party. In order to secure its chances of success at the next elec-
tion, this party has an incentive to enact the policies it supported at the last
election. In party systems that consist of three or more parties, there will,
according to Downs and other proponents of the responsible party model,
be a less effective transmission of voters’ policy preferences into government
actions. Nevertheless, even in multi-party systems the same basic behavioural
mechanisms will be present that motivate governing parties to enact the policy
commitments they made at the last election.
Hypothesis 1: Election pledges made by parties that enter government
office after the elections are more likely to be fulfilled than those made
by parties that enter the opposition after the elections.
The concept of the party mandate posits a particular pattern of congruence
between the contents of election programmes and subsequent government
policies (Klingemann et al. 1994: 48–51). Strictly speaking, the proposition
that pledges made by parties that enter the opposition after the elections is
not an element of mandate theory: ‘A pure mandate theory assumes that
winning is everything. Losers’ programs are ignored or repudiated. Winners’
programs are enacted’ (Klingemann et al. 1994: 48). A more reasonable
variant of mandate theory, however, recognises that the contents of losing
parties’ election programmes also contain responses to legitimate demands
by societal groups. The incorporation of these demands into government
policies can be beneficial to the stability of, and support for, the government.
These demands continue to exert influence on policy makers, even when the
parties that responded to them enter the opposition after the elections. In other
words, elections should have some impact on government policies, but demo-
cracy also demands moderation and the incorporation of losers’ demands
(Klingemann et al. 1994: 49). The inclusion of prospective opposition parties’
election programmes becomes all the more pertinent when the analysis of the
programme to policy linkage focuses on a consensus democracy as defined
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by Lijphart, such as the Netherlands (Lijphart 1999). The mandate model of
the programme to policy linkage is commonly thought to be associated with
majoritarian democracies. Klingemann et al. (1994: 44–48) also specify an
‘agenda model’ in which the contents of party programmes are translated
into government policies regardless of whether they enter government office
after the elections. Such a model may be more applicable to democracies in
which the results of elections do not provide clear indications of winning and
losing parties.1
The second hypothesis concerns the effect of institutions on the pro-
gramme to policy linkage. From an institutional perspective, it is to be
expected that the correspondence between what parties propose prior to
elections and the policies they pursue when in office is less pronounced in co-
alition systems of government than in systems with single party governments
(Klingemann et al. 1994: 33–34). Why should this be the case? Election pro-
grammes contain parties’ expressed preferences regarding the distribution of
the resources available to government. To the extent that the policies pro-
posed by coalition partners are in direct disagreement with each other, it is
inevitable that not all of these proposals can be enacted. Direct confrontations
between parties, however, occur infrequently. It is more common for parties
to compete with each other indirectly, by focusing their attention on the areas
of policy on which they have a relative advantage over their competitors. So,
for example, parties that oppose the maintenance and expansion of social
security programmes are unlikely to argue explicitly for their retrenchment.
Instead, they make proposals on issues, such as the expansion of individual
economic enterprise, that are indirectly opposed to those of more traditional
leftist parties. The proposition that parties ‘talk past’ each other in this way is
central to the saliency theory of party competition (Budge, Robertson & Hearl
1987: 389). Nevertheless, policy proposals that are not directly incompatible
with each other draw on the same pool of available resources. In this sense,
such proposals compete with each other.
Hypothesis 2: Election pledges made by parties that enter coalition gov-
ernments are less likely to be fulfilled than those made by parties that
enter single party governments in parliamentary democracies.
This hypothesis applies to coalition governments and single party govern-
ments with secure parliamentary majorities. The available evidence on the
effect of institutions on the strength of the linkage between parties’ specific
policy proposals and subsequent government policies is provided by a study
comparing US party platforms and the election programmes of British parties.
Royed (1996) concludes that pledges made by governing parties in the United
Kingdom are more likely to be fulfilled than those made by presidential
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parties in the USA. Lijphart distinguishes two dimensions on the basis of
which democracies can be distinguished from each other: the executives-
parties dimension and the federal-unitary dimension. Democracies at one
extreme of the executives-parties dimension have a concentration of executive
power in single party majority cabinets, executive-legislature relationships in
which the executive is dominant, two party systems, majoritarian electoral
systems and pluralist interest group systems. Democracies at one extreme
of the federal-unitary dimension have unitary and centralised government,
concentration of legislative power in unicameral legislatures, flexible consti-
tutions, an absence of judicial review of legislation and central banks that are
dependent on the executive. The institutional differences between the USA
and the UK are located primarily in the federal-unitary dimension, rather
than the executives-parties dimension (Lijphart 1999). The above hypothesis
on the effect of coalition governance refers to an aspect of the executives-
parties dimension on which the UK and the Netherlands differ substantially
from each other.
Hypothesis 3: Election pledges are more likely to be fulfilled if a party
that supports them receives responsibility for the relevant ministerial
post.
The third hypothesis concerns the distribution of ministerial posts between
the coalition partners. Control over bureaucratic officials is one of the re-
sources available to governing parties that enables them to fulfil their election
pledges. This control, held by politicians in ministerial posts, is a resource
that must be distributed between the members of the governing coalition.
Research on coalition formation and policy making within coalitions emphas-
ises the importance of the allocation of ministerial portfolios between parties
(Laver & Shepsle 1994; Laver & Shepsle 1996). The portfolio allocation
model of policy making in coalitions advances the proposition that members
of governing coalitions have relatively little say in policy areas over which
they do not receive ministerial control. It is argued that policy making in
modern states is structured by the division of policy areas into the separate
jurisdictions of departments of government. Due to the complexity of policy
making and the desire to safeguard their own departmental jurisdictions,
ministers confine their influence attempts and the development of their own
subject area expertise to those policy areas that fall under the jurisdiction of
their own ministries. ‘All of this results in the forecast, shared by each of those
involved in building and maintaining a government, that government policy
outputs in any given policy area are best predicted by looking at the position
of the party in control of the portfolio with jurisdiction over the policy area
concerned’ (Laver & Shepsle 1996: 42).
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Hypothesis 4: Election pledges to maintain the status quo are more
likely to be congruent with government policies after the elections than
pledges to introduce some kind of policy change.
Previous studies of pledge fulfilment reported that less radical pledges, and in
particular pledges to maintain the status quo, are more likely to be congruent
with subsequent government policies than pledges to introduce more radical
policy change (Pomper & Lederman 1980; Royed 1996). Research on public
policy inheritance suggests why this should be the case. Rose and Davies
(1994) argue that it is far more difficult for parties to enact policy changes
than to accept the legacy bequeathed to them by previous governments. Once
a decision is taken, it becomes entrenched in bureaucratic procedures. This in-
stitutionalisation is said to foster an inertia in public policy that is particularly
difficult for elected officials to challenge (Rose & Davies 1994: 26–37). The
inheritance of previously enacted policy programmes and decisions is often
viewed as an impediment to the effective functioning of democratic choice.
This, however, fails to take into consideration the fact that the decisions inher-
ited after any given election were taken by politicians in past administrations.
Furthermore, maintenance of the status quo is often the result of choices made
by democratically elected officials (Schmidt 1996: 169). Even in election
programmes concerned primarily with outlining the reforms that parties wish
to make, pledges to maintain the status quo can also be found.
Hypothesis 5: Election pledges to which parties attach higher levels of
saliency are more likely to be fulfilled than those to which they attach
lower levels of saliency.
The importance of a policy proposal to the party that supports it depends not
only on the amount of change involved in the realisation of that proposal.
Clearly, a party may attach a high level of saliency to a pledge to maintain
the status quo, in the sense that it would defend its position vigorously if
challenged to do so. The distinction between the concepts of policy position
and saliency is made clear in the literature on rational choice models of
collective decision making (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1985; Bueno de
Mesquita & Stokman 1994). In these models, actors take policy positions on
issues. Actors’ policy positions are distinct from the levels of saliency that
they attach to these issues. It is therefore possible for a stakeholder to take a
fairly moderate position on an issue, while attaching an extremely high level
of saliency to it. A commonly used operational definition of saliency in this
tradition is the extent to which a stakeholder would be willing to put into
effect its potential capability to influence the outcome of the decision on the
issue concerned, if that issue came up during the course of interaction with
other stakeholders. Rallings (1997: 13) noted that pledges that are ‘clearly
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in keeping with a party’s general philosophy (e.g. the British Conservative
Party’s promise in 1970 to encourage the sale of council houses)’ are more
likely to be acted upon. However, the effect of saliency on the fulfilment of
election pledges has yet to be investigated systematically.
Hypothesis 6: Election pledges that are the subject of consensus between
parties are more likely to be fulfilled than those that are not.
The sixth hypothesis refers to the effect of consensus between parties. It
seems plausible that policy proposals supported by more than one of the main
parties enjoy broader support, and that this would ease the transition from
proposal to action. Indeed, the existing research provides evidence in support
of the hypothesis (Pomper & Lederman 1980: 162–163; Royed 1996: 65–66).
Three types or patterns of consensus can be distinguished in multiparty
systems in which there are at least two governing parties and two opposi-
tion parties: consensus between governing parties, between governing and
opposition parties, and between opposition parties. The first type of consensus
would be expected to contribute most to the likelihood of pledge fulfilment,
given that such pledges have the weight of more than one governing party be-
hind them. Of the three types of consensus, the third type, consensus between
opposition parties, would be expected to contribute least to pledge fulfilment.
Although such pledges may be assumed to have broader support than those
supported by one opposition party only, they do not have the explicit support
of a party that holds government office after the elections.
Hypothesis 7: Election pledges are more likely to be fulfilled if they are
supported explicitly in the coalition agreement, than if they are not.2
Among the factors expected to influence the likelihood of pledge fulfilment
are the outcomes of the negotiations between the prospective coalition part-
ners after the elections. The coalition agreement is a document agreed on
by the prospective coalition partners after the election, specifying the policy
intentions of the new government. In countries where single party govern-
ments are the norm, the election programme of the winning party becomes in
effect the government’s policy agenda. In coalition systems, the government’s
policy agenda has to be constructed by the coalition partners. According to
one view, the formulation of the agreement is said to provide parties with an
opportunity to obtain a commitment from the prospective government to the
enactment of their own preferred policies (Browne & Dreijmanis 1982: 349–
350; Peterson & De Ridder 1986). Although the coalition agreement is not
a legally binding document, reciprocal control is a mechanism that may well
ensure that these agreements are carried out. Each party knows that failure
to carry out the proposals supported by its partner/s may result in the failure
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to enact its own policy proposals. There is a strong normative obligation on
parties to remain faithful to the agreements they have made. For these reasons,
pre-election pledges that are supported in coalition agreements are expected
to foreshadow government actions.
Identifying election pledges and their fulfilment
The selected cases
The three government periods selected for study provide a variety of contexts,
in terms of combinations of governing parties and economic conditions, in
which the linkages between election programmes and government actions
can be investigated. The empirical focus of this research consists of the ful-
filment of the election pledges on socio-economic issues made by the four
main Dutch parties in their election programmes for the 1986, 1989, and
1994 national parliamentary elections for the Lower House (Tweede Kamer).
The parties selected for analysis are the Labour Party (PvdA: Partij van der
Arbeid), the Democrats 66 (D66: Democraten 66), the Christian Democratic
Appeal (CDA: Christen Democratisch Appèl), and the Liberal Party (VVD:
Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie). These parties were selected be-
cause they are generally considered to be the ones with ‘governing potential’.
That is to say, some combination of these four parties is expected to form the
governing coalition. Most political commentators would agree that, at least
as far as the elections studied here are concerned, the ideological positions of
these parties can be placed on a left-right dimension in the following order:
PvdA-D66-CDA-VVD. Together, these parties received an average of 88 per-
cent of the votes cast at these elections.
After the 1986 election, the CDA/VVD coalition that had governed since
1982 remained in office. Like its predecessor, this cabinet attempted to curb
the growth of the large public sector. The early termination of the CDA/VVD
cabinet in 1989, a year before the next regularly scheduled election, was
precipitated by a disagreement between the parliamentary Liberal Party and
the government on taxation policy. A coalition consisting of the CDA and
PvdA was formed after the 1989 election. This cabinet was plagued by a
sharp downturn in the economy and rising numbers of welfare recipients that
led to painful retrenchments in social security programmes. Coupled with
the fact that the PvdA entered the coalition after a long period in opposi-
tion, this cabinet period was a trying one for the PvdA in particular. After
the 1994 election, the so-called purple coalition, consisting of the PvdA,
D66 and VVD was formed. This meant that, for the first time since 1917,
the governing coalition did not contain a Christian Democratic party (the
THE PROGRAMME TO POLICY LINKAGE 179
CDA or one of its predecessors). The 1994–1998 coalition enjoyed a relat-
ively favourable economic situation in comparison with previous years and
other European countries. Economic growth was at a high, employment rose,
and the budget deficit was reduced successfully. This undoubtedly eased co-
operation between the historical adversaries, the PvdA and the VVD.
In order to gauge the implications of empirical findings correctly, it is es-
sential to consider carefully the unique characteristics of the cases selected for
analysis, and what effects these might have on the results. Given the selection
of these cases, are some of the hypotheses more or less likely to be confirmed?
There are indeed certain features of Dutch politics in the selected time period
that lead to particular expectations regarding two of the hypotheses specified
in the previous section: the third hypothesis on the effect of the allocation
of ministerial portfolios, and the seventh hypothesis on the effect of support
for pledges in the coalition agreement. Andeweg & Bakema (1994) con-
sider the relevance of the ministerial portfolio allocation model of coalition
policy making to politics in the Netherlands. Their discussion suggests that
Dutch government ministers in recent cabinets are less autonomous from their
cabinet colleagues than is implied by this model. Ministerial autonomy has
become constrained by the development of strong collective cabinet decision
making.
One of the reasons for this decline in ministerial autonomy is the increased
politicisation of the cabinet, accompanied by a strengthening of the links
between ministers and their parliamentary parties. This has increased the ex-
tent to which ministers feel compelled to interfere in their cabinet colleagues’
portfolios, and the extent to which they feel justified in doing so (Andeweg
& Bakema 1994: 63). The increasing complexity of policy making has made
necessary the creation of a number of mechanisms to co-ordinate policy mak-
ing in different ministerial departments. One of these is the appointment of
‘secretaries of state’, who as junior ministers, are subordinate to ministers, but
have their own areas of policy responsibility. These posts are usually filled by
individuals who do not belong to the same party as the ministers under whom
they serve. They are said to play a ‘watchdog’ role, ensuring that the actions
of the minister are acceptable to their own party. Therefore, there are reasons
to expect less empirical support for the third hypothesis in the Netherlands
than in other countries. With regard to the seventh hypothesis, on the effect of
the coalition agreement, there is more reason to anticipate empirical support
for this hypothesis in recent Dutch cabinets than in governing coalitions in
which these documents played less prominent roles. The lengthy negotiations
typical of Dutch coalition formation result in detailed agreements setting out
the prospective coalitions’ policy intentions. In some other countries and time
periods, the coalition agreements signed by prospective coalition parties are
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much shorter in length and less detailed; sometimes, these documents are not
made public.
Measurement
The measurements used in assessing election pledges and their fulfilment are
similar to those used by Royed, whose research included an analysis of the
pledges made by parties in the United Kingdom (1996). This makes possible a
comparison of pledge fulfilment in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
Pledges are defined as statements in which parties express unequivocal sup-
port for proposed government policy actions or non-actions that are testable.
The inclusion of a ‘testability’ requirement is important for obtaining reliable
measurements of the fulfilment of election pledges. The criteria used to judge
the fulfilment of pledges are in principle provided by the writers of election
programmes, not by the researcher. The reliability of the identification of
pledges in the election programmes was tested and found to be strong.3
The judgements on the fulfilment of election pledges were made following
a search for government decisions, parliamentary legislation and executive
orders, that were congruent or incongruent with the proposals supported in
the pledges. Such proposals may include, for example, the reduction of a
particular rate or type of taxation, or certain adjustments to welfare bene-
fit programmes. The search began by reading policy reviews of the main
sub-fields of socio-economic policy, and annually published reviews of par-
liamentary debates. This general orientation allowed the election pledges
to be placed in the context of the policy developments and debates of the
day. The main part of the search was carried out using a CD ROM database
containing references to, and short descriptions of, all government decisions
taken since 1 January 1986. If an election pledge was not followed by a con-
gruent government action during the subsequent governing period, the pledge
was categorised as not acted upon. The variable ‘fulfilment’ was defined as
one consisting of three categories: ‘not fulfilled’, ‘partially fulfilled’, and
‘fully fulfilled’. The inclusion of a partially fulfilled category is made neces-
sary by the fact that some policy action may be taken in the direction indicated
by the pledge, falling short of full realisation of the proposal in question. The
reliability of the measurement of fulfilment was tested by presenting subject
area specialists with a selection of the pledges, and asking them to place these
into one of the three fulfilment categories. It was found that the reliability
of this three category indicator of fulfilment was satisfactory. However, if
the variable is dichotomised into the categories ‘fully/partially fulfilled’, and
‘not fulfilled’, then the measurements are substantially more reliable. There-
fore, in the multivariate tests of the hypotheses presented in section 4, this
dichotomous measurement of fulfilment is used.4
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Examples of election pledges and their fulfilment
To illustrate the statements that were identified as election pledges, and the
government actions that constituted their fulfilment, this section contains a
brief review of some of the pledges made in the policy area of welfare be-
nefits. Table 1 also includes a list of some of the pledges made in the area
of income tax. More generally, a qualitative investigation was carried out on
the election pledges on which in this research project focuses. It was found
that the election pledges were associated with the main policy developments
as described in policy reviews written by subject area specialists. Election
pledges were found on issues that are generally perceived to be societally
relevant. Pledges were made on issues such as adjustments to the values
of welfare benefits, the organisation and provision of health care, housing
subsidies, student finance, employment rights, and levels of taxation.
After a period of expansion of welfare programmes that lasted until the
1970s, a policy of retrenchment began. This included a reduction in earnings-
related welfare benefits for those who became unemployed, from 80 percent
of their last earned salary to 70 percent between 1984 and 1986. It was in this
context that the CDA/VVD cabinet was formed in 1986. Broadly speaking,
the election programmes of both these parties revealed their intention to con-
tinue the policy of attempting to restrict the growth of welfare programmes.
In its 1986 election programme, the PvdA was particularly critical of these
policy developments, and pledged that earnings-related benefits would be in-
creased to 75 per cent of the last earned income. The policies enacted during
the 1986–1989 cabinet period were clearly more in line with those set out
in the manifestos of the CDA and VVD. Earnings-related welfare benefits
were not increased, and the value of other types of benefits remained frozen
at their 1986 levels. The policy of restricting the growth of expenditure on
welfare programmes was eased somewhat after the 1989 election and the
formation of the CDA/PvdA cabinet. Instead of freezing the value of welfare
benefits, they were increased in line with incomes in two of the four years
in which this administration took a decision on the matter. These increases
were judged to constitute a partial fulfilment of the proposal, supported by
the PvdA and D66, to restore the coupling between increases in welfare
benefits and increases in employees’ incomes. There were clear differences
of position between the parties that formed the governing coalition after the
1994 election. One salient issue was whether or not the value of welfare
benefits should be adjusted in line with increases in incomes. Government
policy during the 1994–1998 period was congruent with the PvdA’s pledge
to apply the coupling between benefits and incomes, and incongruent with
the VVD’s pledge to freeze benefits at their 1994 levels. The VVD’s 1994
election programme was a particularly radical one; it contained proposals for
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the introduction of a so-called basic system of welfare, in which the value of
benefits that are related to the minimum wage would be reduced substantially.
These proposals were opposed explicitly in the programmes of the PvdA and
D66, in which it was stated that these benefits would remain at their present
levels in relation to the minimum wage. These benefits were not reduced, and
the VVD’s pledge was unfulfilled, while the pledge supported by the PvdA
and D66 was met.
Of course, policy measures were also taken that were not preceded by
election pledges. The example of adjustments to the welfare programme for
the disabled suggests that there are also policy developments not foreseen
in parties’ election programmes. As mentioned above, the 1989-1994 gov-
ernment period was a trying one for the PvdA in particular. One reason for
this was the dramatic and unexpected growth in the numbers of recipients
of disability benefits. After a political crisis that almost led to the break-up
of this coalition, it was decided that measures would be taken to restrict the
growth of this programme. These measures were not, however, foreshadowed
by specific pledges in any of the election programmes. After this policy
development was set in motion during the 1989–1994 government period,
the parties responded to it. In 1993 came the imposition of more obligations
on employers to pay and reintegrate employees who had become unfit for
work. In their programmes for the 1994 election, the CDA and D66 pledged
support for the expansion of these responsibilities. In accordance with these
pledges, legislation was introduced by which employers became responsible
for paying their employees during the first year of sickness. This was a contro-
versial piece of legislation that raised concerns that employers would become
even less likely to employ individuals whom they suspected of being prone
to illness.
Analysis
The simplest way of testing the hypothesis, that election pledges made by
parties that enter government are more likely to be fulfilled than those made
by parties that do not, is to compare the percentages of pledges from each
election programme that were acted upon in some way (Table 2). On the
whole, Table 2 supports the hypothesis. Whether the comparison is based on
the percentages of ‘fully’ fulfilled pledges, or those that were ‘not’ fulfilled,
the conclusion is the same. A higher proportion of pledges made by parties
that entered the governing coalition were acted upon than those made by
parties that entered opposition. The first hypothesis is also confirmed by the
results of the more sophisticated multivariate test presented in Table 8. The
multivariate analysis allows the effect of each of the variables on the likeli-
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Table 1. Examples of election pledges on welfare and taxation
Summary of pledge (party, year) Results∗
Increase income related benefits to 75% of last earned income (PvdA, 1986) NF
Apply coupling between benefits and incomes (D66, PvdA, 1989) PF
Apply coupling between benefits and incomes (PvdA, 1994) FF
Freeze benefits at 1994 levels (VVD, 1994) NF
Reduce welfare entitlements for single people with and without children to 80% NF
and 60% of the minimum wage respectively (VVD, 1994)
Maintain welfare entitlements at present levels (D66, PvdA, 1994) FF
Expand employers’ responsibility for the payment of benefits during short term FF
illness of their employees (CDA, D66, 1994)
Reduce tax burden on incomes (CDA, D66, VVD, 1986) FF
Reduce tax burden on incomes of those earning up to one and a half times the FF
modal salary (PvdA, 1986)
At the least, no increase in the tax burden (CDA, 1989) NF
Reduce total burden of income tax (VVD, 1989) NF
Levy social premiums on income subject to the second rate of income tax (PvdA, NF
1994)
Reduce basic rate of income tax (CDA, D66, 1994) FF
Reduce basic rate of income tax to 35 per cent (PvdA, 1994) PF
Extend the set of incomes subject to the second rate of income tax in an upward FF
direction (CDA, VVD, 1994)
Reduce top rate of income tax (D66, 1994) NF
∗FF: Fully fulfilled; PF: Partially fulfilled; NF: Not fulfilled.
hood of pledge fulfilment to be estimated, while controlling for the effects
of the other hypothesised explanatory variables. The dependent variable in
this analysis is a dichotomous one that indicates whether a pledge to take
a particular policy action was fulfilled at least partially.5 The coefficient in
the row labelled ‘Government’ in Table 8 indicates that, controlling for the
effects of the other variables, pledges supported by parties that took part in
the coalition after the elections were 2.2 times more likely to be acted upon
at least partially than those supported by parties that entered the opposition.
There are another two noteworthy features of Table 2 in relation to the
mandate hypothesis. The first is the relatively low percentage of pledges made
by the PvdA in 1989 that were fulfilled. After the 1989 election, a somewhat
higher percentage of the opposition Liberal Party’s pledges were ‘fully’ ful-
filled (35%) than of those made by the governing Labour Party (29%). If both
the ‘fully’ and ‘partially’ fulfilled pledges are considered together, a slightly
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Table 2. The fulfilment of election pledges on socio-economic issues in the Nether-
lands, 1986–1998
1986 PvdA D66 CDA VVD
Fully 14% (16) 16% (11) 43% (36) 40% (44)
Partially 7% (8) 3% (2) 7% (6) 10% (11)
Not 79% (89) 81% (54) 50% (42) 50% (54)
Total socio-economic/tested 113 67 84 109
1989 PvdA D66 CDA VVD
Fully 29% (22) 20% (15) 45% (39) 35% (30)
Partially 16% (12) 9% (7) 8% (7) 8% (7)
Not 55% (42) 71% (54) 47% (40) 56% (48)
Total socio-economic/tested 76 76 86 85
1994 PvdA D66 CDA VVD
Fully 55% (31) 50% (54) 35% (31) 56% (30)
Partially 18% (10) 14% (15) 17% (15) 13% (7)
Not 27% (15) 37% (40) 48% (43) 31% (17)
Total socio-economic/tested 56 109 89 54
Percentages of the total numbers of tested pledges from each manifestos that were fully,
partially, and not fulfilled (numbers of fully, partially and not fulfilled socio-economic
pledges from each manifesto). Governing parties in bold.
higher percentage of the Labour Party’s pledges were fulfilled than those of
the opposition Liberal Party. This accords with the conventional wisdom that
the 1989–1994 government period was a particularly difficult one for the
Labour Party. The stagnation of economic growth and the painful retrench-
ments in social security entitlements during the so-called ‘disability benefits
crisis’ were not foreseen at the time when the 1989 election programme was
written. Second, with regard to the 1994 election programmes, it is notable
that despite the evidence of a mandate pattern of linkage, a relatively large
number of the Christian Democrats’ policy proposals were fulfilled. During
this government period, the CDA was criticised by political commentators
for not providing a vigorous enough opposition to the cabinet. Various ex-
planations have been offered for this, such as the absence of experience with
the role of opposition within the CDA, the preoccupation with internal re-
appraisals in the aftermath of the 1994 election defeat, and the favourable
economic situation enjoyed during this period. The figures in Table 2 suggest
another explanation. It is difficult for a party to provide vigorous opposition
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to a government that enacts policies that are congruent with many of its own
policy commitments.
Regarding variation in the fulfilment of pledges between government peri-
ods, it is most striking that a higher proportion of pledges made in the 1994
election programmes was fulfilled than in those of 1986 or 1989. The most
obvious explanation for this difference is the favourable economic situation
during the 1994–1998 government period. This created government income
that could be used to finance pledges, such as the coupling of welfare benefits
to incomes, and tax reductions. It is interesting to note that the 1994 election
programmes were based on conservative forecasts of economic growth during
the 1994–1998 period; actual growth turned out to be much higher. Therefore,
despite the fact that the forecasts on which these election programmes were
based proved to be inaccurate, relatively large proportions of the pledges they
contained were acted upon. The results of the multivariate analysis presented
in Table 8 also indicate the presence of significant variation between these
three governing periods regarding the likelihood of pledge fulfilment.
Table 3 contains information relating to the second hypothesis: pledges
made by parties that enter coalition governments are less likely to be fulfilled
than those made by parties that enter single party governments in parliament-
ary democracies. The information contained in Table 3 was collected by Terry
Royed (1992, 1996). The data collected by Royed were adjusted to make
them comparable with those collected on the Dutch parties. A comparison
of Table 2 with Table 3 supports the above hypothesis. Pledges made by
parties that go on to form Dutch governments are substantially less likely to
be acted upon that those made by parties that form single party governments
in the United Kingdom. Even during the 1994–1998 government period,
during which relatively large percentages of Dutch parties’ pledges were
translated into government actions, the percentages of governing parties’
pledges that were ‘not’ fulfilled were high, if compared to the data on the
British Conservative Party’s pledges.6
Table 4 contains data relating to the third hypothesis, that pledges are more
likely to be fulfilled if a party that supports them receives responsibility for
the relevant ministerial post. Of the coalition parties’ pledges that fell under
their ministerial responsibility, 55 percent were fulfilled at least partially. Of
the coalition parties’ pledges that did not fall under their ministerial respons-
ibility, only 36 percent were fulfilled at least partially. The hypothesis is also
supported by the results of the multivariate analysis presented in Table 8. The
coefficient in the row labelled ‘Ministry’ in Table 8 indicates that pledges
supported by parties that were allocated the relevant ministerial portfolios
after the elections were 1.6 times more likely to be fulfilled than pledges that
were not supported by such a party. This finding is surprising considering the
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Table 3. The fulfilment of election pledges made by the prospective governing party in the
United Kingdom, 1979–1987
Fulfilment 1979 1983
Socio- Other Total Socio- Other Total
economic areas economic areas
Fully 72% (34) 43% 10) 63% (44) 73% (38) 86% (19) 77% (57)
Partially 15% (7) 43% (10) 24% (17) 10% (5) 9% (2) 9% (7)
Not 13% (6) 13% (3) 13% (9) 17% (9) 5% (1) 14% (10)
Total 100% (47) 99% (23) 100% (70) 100% (52) 100% (22) 100% (74)
Pledges by the Conservative Party in its 1979 and 1983 manifestos. Figures refer to percent-
ages (and numbers) of pledges that fall into the row categories. Data were adjusted to be
comparable with those referred to in Table 2. Source: Royed (1992).
Table 4. The allocation of ministerial portfolios on pledge fulfilment
Fulfilment Did a coalition party that supported the pledge receive
the relevant ministry?
No Yes Total
Partially/fully fulfilled 66 (36%) 107 (55%) 173 (46%)
Not fulfilled 119 (64%) 87 (45%) 206 (54%)
Total 185 (100%) 194 (100%) 379 (100%)
The data in this table exclude status quo pledges and pledges supported by prospective oppos-
ition parties only. Pledges supported by more than one governing party are counted as single
pledges. This accounts for differences between these figures and those contained in Table 2.
reservations mentioned earlier about the relevance of the portfolio allocation
model to Dutch politics.
The fourth hypothesis is that pledges to maintain the status quo are more
likely to be fulfilled than pledges to introduce some kind of policy change.
As in previous studies of election pledges, strong empirical support for this
hypothesis was found. Table 5 provides information on the numbers of status
quo pledges made by each of the parties in each election programme, and
the numbers that were fulfilled. The largest numbers of status quo pledges
were found in the 1986 election programmes of the CDA and the VVD. In
both cases all of these status quo pledges were congruent with subsequent
government policy. In all cases, a relatively large proportion of the status quo
pledges were fulfilled, certainly when compared to the proportions of fulfilled
pledges as a whole from the same election programmes (Table 2).7
The fifth hypothesis posits that pledges to which parties attach a higher
level of saliency are more likely to be fulfilled than those to which they attach
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Table 5. The fulfilment of status quo pledges
on socio-economic policy
Year PvdA D66 CDA VVD
1986 6/7 7/9 22/22 22/22
1989 8/12 5/7 8/9 13/14
1994 11/12 15/16 13/15 6/6
Number of fulfilled status quo pledges in the
election programme/total number of status
quo pledges in the election programme.
a lower level of saliency. The evidence does not support this hypothesis. The
levels of saliency parties attached to their election pledges were measured
using data collected by the Manifestos Research Group. These data consist
of the emphasis parties placed on various policy themes in their election
programmes. For the analysis presented in Table 8, it was assumed that
parties attached higher levels of saliency to pledges within policy themes they
emphasised more. The coefficient in the row labelled ‘Saliency’ in Table 8
indicates that pledges within salient policy themes are no more likely to be
acted upon than pledges within policy themes less salient to the parties that
made them.8
Table 6 contains information that allows us to address the effect of con-
sensus between parties on the likelihood of pledge fulfilment. Of the pledges
supported by more than one of the prospective coalition parties, 78 percent
were categorised as at least partially fulfilled. By comparison, only 37 percent
of the pledges supported by only one prospective coalition party were acted
upon. When Dutch governing parties agree with each other, it would appear
that they are as able to translate their policy proposals into government actions
as governing parties in the United Kingdom. The results of the multivariate
analysis in Table 8 provide a test of the consensus hypothesis and allow us
to distinguish between the effects of different types of consensus. The first
consensus coefficient, ‘consensus between governing parties’, indicates that
pledges supported by more than one of the parties that went on to form
part of the coalition were 3.1 times more likely to be fulfilled than those
that were not. Pledges supported by at least one prospective governing party
and a prospective opposition party were also more (1.5 times) more likely
to be fulfilled; however, this is not statistically significant (p = 0.16). Con-
sensus between opposition parties does not appear to increase the likelihood
of pledge fulfilment.
There are relatively few instances of direct dissensus between parties evid-
ent in the direct relationships between their election pledges. This limits the
188 ROBERT THOMSON
Table 6. Consensus among governing parties and pledge fulfilment
Fulfilment Was the pledge supported by one or more than one coalition
party?
One only More than one Total
Partially/fully fulfilled 112 (37%) 61 (78%) 173 (46%)
Not fulfilled 189 (63%) 17 (22%) 206 (54%)
Total 301 (100%) 78 (100%) 379 (100%)
The data in this table exclude status quo pledges and pledges supported by prospective
opposition parties only. Pledges supported by more than one governing party are counted
as single pledges. This accounts for differences between these figures and those contained
in Table 2.
possibilities of analysing the implications this type of relationship between
pledges has for their fulfilment. Accordingly, no hypothesis was formulated
regarding the effect of direct dissensus between parties. Nevertheless, the
most common pattern of direct dissensus between parties relates to the fourth
hypothesis on status quo pledges. This pattern consists of issues on which
at least one party pledged support for a continuation of the status quo on a
specific policy issue while one or more parties supported a policy change on
that issue. A total of 38 such issues are found in the data from the twelve elec-
tion programmes considered here. Given the strong support for the hypothesis
that status quo pledges are more likely to be fulfilled than action pledges, a
bias towards the status quo might be expected when this pattern of dissensus
between parties occurs. In other words, it may be expected that action pledges
which are dissensually related to pledges calling for a maintenance of the
status quo, are less likely to be fulfilled than action pledges which are not. The
statistics in the row labelled ‘dissensus’ in Table 8 allow this expectation to be
tested. Although the (exponentiated) coefficient is in the expected direction
(less than one), it is not statistically significant. Therefore, the results do not
provide convincing evidence of a bias toward the status quo as a result of
dissensus between parties.
Finally, it was hypothesised that support for pledges in the coalition agree-
ment increases the likelihood that they will be fulfilled (hypothesis 7). There
is strong evidence in support of this hypothesis. Table 7 contains information
on the fulfilment of pledges that were supported in the coalition agreements.
Note that only pledges that were first supported in an election programme
and then repeated in the coalition agreement are considered here. Policy
initiatives contained in a coalition agreement that were not preceded by a
manifesto commitment were excluded. At least some policy action was taken
in line with 138 of the 168 pledges (82%) of the prospective governing parties
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Table 7. The fulfilment of election pledges that were supported in the
coalition agreements
1986 PvdA D66 CDA VVD
Fully 43% (3) 18% (2) 47% (8) 64% (18)
Partially 0 9% (1) 12% (2) 11% (3)
Not 57% (4) 73% (8) 41% (7) 25% (7)
Total supported 100% (7) 100% (11) 100% (17) 100% (28)
in agreement
1989 PvdA D66 CDA VVD
Fully 48% (11) 50% (9) 65% (15) 62% (8)
Partially 30% (7) 17% (3) 4% (1) 15% (2)
Not 22% (5) 33% (6) 30% (7) 23% (3)
Total supported 100% (23) 100% (18) 99% (23) 100% (13)
in agreement
1994 PvdA D66 CDA VVD
Fully 80% (16) 76% (25) 39% (7) 79% (19)
Partially 20% (4) 21% (7) 44% (8) 8% (2)
Not 0 3% (1) 17% (3) 13% (3)
Total supported 100% (20) 100% (33) 100% (18) 100% (24)
in agreement
Percentages of the total numbers of pre-election pledges also supported in
the coalition agreements after the elections that were fully, partially, and
not fulfilled (N). Governing parties in bold.
supported in the agreements. This is a considerably higher percentage than
the one pertaining to the fulfilment of governing parties’ election pledges
as a whole (61%; see Table 2). Similarly, Table 7 shows that the majority
of opposition parties’ pledges supported in the coalition agreements were
fulfilled at least partially: 42 of the 67 supported pledges (63%). In addition to
supporting the above hypothesis, the information in Table 7 suggests that gov-
erning parties’ pledges supported in the coalition agreement are more likely
to be fulfilled than opposition parties’ pledges supported in the agreement.
The results of the multivariate analyses presented in Table 8 provide a
more sophisticated test of the seventh hypothesis. Controlling for the effects
of the other hypothesised variables of influence, election pledges that were
supported in the subsequent coalition agreement were six times more likely
to be acted upon than those that were not.
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Before specifying the multivariate model presented in Table 8, the vari-
ables that influence the likelihood of support for pledges in the coalition
agreements were considered. This pre-analysis was necessary to investigate
the relationships between the effect of support in the agreements and the
effects of the other variables discussed above. Briefly, some of the variables
that were expected to influence the likelihood of pledge fulfilment were found
to influence the likelihood of support for pledges in the coalition agreement.
Specifically, pledges made by prospective governing parties, that were the
subject of consensus between parties, and those that were highly salient to
the parties that made them were more likely to be supported in the coali-
tion agreements than those that were not (Thomson 1999b). Analytically, this
means that support for pledges in the agreement could be conceptualised as
an intervening variable. In other words, the effect on fulfilment of some of
the other independent variables might be mediated by the support for pledges
in the coalition agreement.
Whether or not this is the case can be tested by estimating models with
and without the supposed intervening variable (DeMaris 1992: 56–60). If
the coalition agreement is indeed an intervening variable, then a model ex-
cluding this term should lead to an increase in the size and significance of
the mediated variables. The model excluding this term did not, with one
exception, lead to an increase in the strength or significance of the remain-
ing coefficients.9 This exception concerns the effect of consensus between
prospective governing and opposition parties on pledge fulfilment. When ex-
cluding the variable ‘Support in coalition agreement’ from the model, the
coefficient relating to ‘Consensus between governing and opposition parties’
increases in size and strength (from Exp(b) 1.5; p = 0.16 in Table 3 to Exp(b)
2.0; p = 0.01). This indicates that when formulating coalition agreements,
the negotiating parties endeavour to include support for policy initiatives that
enjoy broad support, such as those also favoured by opposition parties. How-
ever, on the whole, support for pledges in the coalition agreement should not
be described as an intervening variable.
Conclusion
For democratic theory, possibly the most important finding of this research
concerns the comparison of the fulfilment of pledges supported by parties
that entered governing coalitions in the Netherlands, with pledges supported
by parties that formed the opposition after these elections. As hypothesised,
governing parties’ pledges were significantly more likely to be acted upon
than opposition parties’ pledges. This finding provides evidence of the applic-
ability of the mandate model of the programme to policy linkage during this
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Consensus between governing parties 3.1∗∗∗
Consensus between governing and opposition parties 1.5





GM 171.1 (p = 0, 00)
R2L 0.26
N 677
Multiple logistic regression analyses of the fulfilment of election pledges in
the 1986, 1989, and 1994 election programmes of the four main Dutch parties.
With the exception of the constant (B), the numbers refer to the exponentiated
coefficients, and can therefore be interpreted as odds ratios.
∗ p < 0.10; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
period. This study is the first in which the fulfilment of pledges in a coalition
system of government is examined. It was found that at least some policy
actions were taken on a majority of the election pledges made by parties that
went on to form coalition governments (61%). In the light of this evidence,
it cannot be argued simply that parties do not fulfil their election pledges.
The fact that substantial proportions of the Dutch parties’ pledges were ful-
filled suggests that coalition systems are not as handicapped in this respect
as a crude examination of formal institutions might suggest. This is due to
the scarcity of direct confrontations between parties in terms of the specific
policy proposals they support. This is an important characteristic of party
competition that has been found to be present in many party systems (Budge,
Robertson & Hearl 1987). In other words, the realisation of one party’s policy
initiative may be in competition with those of other parties, in the sense that
the enactment of that proposal requires resources that cannot then be used for
the enactment of those other proposals. However, it is seldom the case that
policy proposals exclude, by definition, the enactment of initiatives supported
by other parties. Despite the fact that substantial proportions of the election
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pledges made in the election programmes of Dutch governing parties were
fulfilled, substantially higher proportions of pledges made by British parties
that entered government office were acted upon. This finding supports the
hypothesis that governing parties’ pledges are less likely to be fulfilled in
coalition systems than in single party governments.
The saliency approach (Klingemann et al. 1994) has also been used to
study the programme to policy linkage. This approach focuses on the con-
gruence between the emphases parties place on various policy themes and
subsequent government spending patterns in related policy areas. In the sa-
liency approach it is assumed, for example, that parties which place more
emphasis on the policy theme of ‘law and order’ in their election programme
are in favour of more public expenditure on related policy areas. One way of
comparing the saliency approach with the pledge approach is to compare the
empirical results generated by both. These would appear to differ consider-
ably. Notably, the particularly damning conclusions regarding the programme
to policy linkage in the Netherlands stated by the proponents of the saliency
approach were not replicated in the present research. On the basis of findings
generated within the framework of the saliency approach, it was argued that
the Dutch Labour Party and the Conservative Liberal Party made a series
of ‘Faustian bargains’ with the Christian Democrats, in which in exchange
for participation in government office, they allowed policies to be pursued
that were incongruent with their ideological preferences (Klingemann et al.
1994: 259–260). Further, using the saliency approach it was found that in the
United Kingdom, opposition parties’ election programmes were not less con-
gruent with subsequent government policies than the election programmes of
prospective governing parties (Klingemann et al. 1994: 261). This is at odds
with findings based on the pledge approach (Royed 1996).
Of course, the saliency approach has been applied to a longer time period
and to more countries than the pledge approach. Therefore, in order to
identify the correspondence between the results of the two approaches ad-
equately, and the conditions under which the results correspond and diverge,
more data are needed on the fulfilment of election pledges, both in govern-
ment periods in the past and by governments in more countries. Such data
are also needed to investigate the effects of variation in socio-economic con-
ditions and government institutions. It cannot be argued convincingly that
differences between the two approaches are due to the fact that one is based
on appropriate measurements of the programme to policy linkage while the
other is not. The proven importance of thematic emphases in the context of
party competition, and the significant levels of congruence between these em-
phases and subsequent spending patterns mean that the results of the saliency
approach cannot be dismissed in this way (Budge et al. 1987; Klingemann
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et al. 1994). Similarly, existing research on election pledges shows that these
constitute an important element of political discourse. No study of the con-
gruence between election programmes and subsequent government policies
can dismiss the results of either of these approaches legitimately.
One of the advantages of the pledge approach is that it facilitates the
study of mechanisms of cabinet governance: for example, those involving
the distribution of ministerial portfolios, consensus between parties and the
coalition agreement. It was found that election pledges are significantly more
likely to be acted upon if a party that supported them receives the relevant
ministerial post. This is a particularly surprising finding because there are
specific features of cabinet governance in the Netherlands that lead to the
expectation of a weak effect of the distribution of ministerial portfolios in
this regard. The implication is that if an effect is present in the Dutch case,
then a much stronger effect will be evident in other countries, where such
mitigating features are absent. In comparison to the other effects identified
in this analysis, the effect associated with the allocation of ministries is not
particularly strong. The combinations of election pledges that are fulfilled are
not determined by the structure of ministerial portfolios. There are clearly
other ways in which coalition parties seek to ensure the fulfilment of their
election pledges. One of these concerns the coalition agreement.
The findings of this study confirm that the formulation of the coalition
agreement is a stage of crucial importance in Dutch politics. Election pledges
supported in the coalition agreements are significantly more likely to be
fulfilled than those that are not. This is an important finding, because the for-
mulation of the coalition agreement takes place in a decision making situation
that is quite distinct from policy making during the lifetime of governments.
In related research, it has been shown that these closed negotiations enable
party representatives to impose their own preferred policy priorities on the
government’s policy agenda. In particular, pledges to which parties attached
higher levels of saliency are significantly more likely to be supported in the
agreement than those to which they attach lower levels of saliency (Thomson
1999b). Party representatives are severely constrained in their ability to im-
pose priorities in this way during the governing periods. Indeed, the findings
presented here show that pledges which are particularly salient to parties are
no more likely to be congruent with subsequent government actions than
pledges to which they attach lower levels of saliency.
Strong evidence was found in support of the hypothesis that pledges to
maintain the status quo are more likely to be congruent with subsequent
government policies than pledges to take policy actions. This accords with
the conclusions of an extensive qualitative investigation that was also carried
out in this research project. The amount of change involved in a policy pro-
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posal affects the difficulty governments encounter when attempting to fulfil
it. The pledges identified in the manifestos were ‘doable’, in the sense that
they fall within the authority of the government, and few constitute radical
departures from prior policy developments. This does not, however, mean
that the fulfilment of pledges is of little consequence for the societal groups
concerned. There are numerous examples of pledges on issues of importance,
such as the coupling between incomes and welfare benefits, the creation of
employment in the collective sector, income taxes, and shop closing hours.
Whether or not these pledges were fulfilled had important consequences for
substantial numbers of citizens.
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Notes
1. To the extent that opposition parties have been included in research on pledge fulfilment,
the evidence supports the above hypothesis. It cannot, however, be said that empirical
support for this hypothesis is a foregone conclusion in the context of the cases selected
for analysis in the present research. Studies on US party platforms show that parties
which lost the presidential elections saw substantial proportions of their pledges fulfilled:
sometimes as many as the presidential party (Pomper & Lederman 1980; Royed 1996).
2. Coalition agreements contain specifications of what the prospective coalitions intend to
do when if office, rather than what they do not intend to do: explicit rejections of parties’
election pledges in the coalition agreements are rare. It is for this reason that the seventh
hypothesis is phrased in terms of the effect of support for pledges in the agreement, rather
than the effect of rejection of pledges in the agreement.
3. Royed’s study was, to my knowledge, the first to test the reliability of the identification of
election pledges. Royed reports an inter-coder reliability of 84 percent (1996: 79–80). A
research assistant independently coded a selection of pages from the election programmes
I analysed. Of the 226 statements we identified as election pledges, we agreed on 199: a
reliability of 88 percent, comparable with that reported by Royed. The most important
difference between the definition of election pledges used here, and that used by Royed
is that the present study is confined to policy actions, whereby ‘outcome pledges’ are
excluded. In section 4 of this article, the data collected by Royed will be manipulated
to exclude these outcome pledges, enabling a comparison with pledge fulfilment in the
Netherlands.
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4. Subject area specialists were asked to judge the fulfilment of 110 of the pledges made
prior to the 1994 election. On the basis of the three category measurement of fulfilment,
there was an inter-coder reliability, measured by Cohen’s Kappa, of 0.70. For the dicho-
tomous fulfilment variable there was a Cohen’s Kappa of 0.78. As a rule of thumb, Kappa
values of around 0.60 are generally considered to be satisfactory, while values of around
0.80 indicate that the measure is strongly reliable.
5. Pledges to maintain the status quo are treated distinctly from action pledges in the data set
on which the multivariate analysis is performed. A value of 1 on the dependent variable
indicates that a policy action was taken that changed the status quo in the direction of
an action pledge, if any such pledge was made. A value of 0 on the dependent variable
indicates that the status quo was maintained on the issue concerned, which may have been
congruent with a pledge to maintain the status quo. I am grateful to Tom Snijders at the
Department of Statistics and Methodology, University of Groningen, for proposing this
organisation of the data set, which makes the analysis more powerful and elegant than
it would otherwise have been. Tests for collinearity were performed before running the
logistic regression. Bivariate correlations between each of the independent variables were
calculated: the range of the absolute values of these correlations was 0.00 to 0.56, mean
0.16. Linear regressions were performed on each of the independent variables, using the
remaining independent variables as predictors: the R2 ranged from 0.18 to 0.56, mean
0.34.
6. It is also possible to compare the findings on the fulfilment of pledges in the Netherlands
with the results of pledge fulfilment in the United Kingdom obtained by studies that cover
different time periods than that of Royed: for example, Rose (1980), and Rallings (1987).
The results of these comparisons are the same. Royed’s study is featured here because
the definitions she uses are explicated most clearly, and the data she collected were made
available for adjustment on the basis of the definitions used in the present research. This
enables the comparison to be as valid as possible.
7. The status quo hypothesis was also tested using an alternative research design with the
same result. A separate logistic regression was carried out for each election programme,
in which status quo pledges were treated in the same way as action pledges, and the de-
pendent variable was simply whether or not the pledge was fulfilled. The advantage of this
research design is that it allows the status quo hypothesis to be tested while controlling for
the effects of the other hypothesised independent variables. The disadvantage is that the
analyses are fragmented and the statistical power unnecessarily limited. The coefficient
in the row labelled ‘Status quo’ in Table 8 should be interpreted as follows. With regard
to the policy issues on which action pledges and/or status quo pledges were made, policy
actions, in the direction proposed by an action pledge if any such pledge was made, were
less likely to occur (0,6 times as likely), if one of the parties pledged to maintain the status
quo on that issue. It should be noted that this coefficient is not significant and that it does
not relate directly to the hypothesis under investigation (hypothesis 4).
8. I am grateful to Paul Pennings of the Free University of Amsterdam for making the
Manifestos Research Group data available. Quadratic and logarithmic transformations of
this indicator of saliency were experimented with. In addition, an alternative measure of
saliency was applied: the extent to which the party that made the pledge also devoted at-
tention to the same issue in its previous election programmes. None of the results provided
support for the hypothesis.
9. The model excluding the government agreement as a variable that influences the likeli-
hood of pledge fulfilment was as follows: Constant b: 0.9∗∗∗; Ministry, Exp(b): 1.7∗∗;
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Saliency, Exp(b): 1.0; Status quo, Exp(b): 0.5; Consensus between governing parties,
Exp(b): 3.6∗∗∗; Consensus between governing and opposition parties, Exp(b): 2.0∗∗;
Consensus between opposition parties, Exp(b): 1.4; Dissensus, Exp(b): 1.8; Year 1989,
Exp(b): 2.1∗∗∗; Year 1994, Exp(b): 3.4∗∗∗. GM : 171.1, p = 0.00; R2L: 0.20; N = 677.
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